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Our civil justice system is part statutory and part common law. Even the
statutory parts, of course, have little meaning without common law
articulation, which, itself, becomes common law. So our civil justice system
is better (if not perfectly) described as a common law civil justice system.
The two terms-"common law" and "civil justice system"-identify two
crucial functions of our system: to create rules and dispense justice.
Countless pages, and some entire lives, have been devoted to exploring and
defining the meaning of "rules" and of "justice."' In this short Essay-having
only pages to offer-I use simple versions of both terms. By "rules," I mean
the principles which can be extracted from a decision regarding how future
cases would turn out. By "justice," I mean the fair resolution of the dispute
between the parties.
Regardless of the simplicity of the definitions employed, rules and
justice are grand concepts. The aim of this Essay is to view them more
mundanely, not because a mundane view offers a full account of either rules
or justice, but because it may, given the advances in information technology
in the twenty-first century, do considerable service as an agent of civil justice
reform. The mundane view, taken below, is to view "rules" and "justice" as
outputs of a system, namely, the civil justice system. Objective (or largely
objective) measures of those things-extracted from the wealth of heretofore
inaccessible data about the system--can be used to inform reform discussions.
In Part I, I explain why thinking of the law as a system, in an admittedly
reductionist way, is a useful approach. It is not the only approach, or even the
best approach. Whatever its imperfections, however, it is an approach from
which considerable utility can flow. In Part II, I consider the task of
measuring the legal system's rule output and predict that, whatever the
practical difficulties, efforts to do so will occur in the near future. In Part III,
* Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law; J.D. Harvard Law School; A.B.
Stanford University. Many thanks to the Washburn Law Journal for organizing an issue on the important
topic of budget constraints and access to justice and inviting me to contribute.
1. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE:
REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES (Frederick
Schauer ed., 2011); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
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I suggest that the increasing availability of system data, and means to measure
it, favors a decentralized approach to reform along federalism lines.
II. LAW AS SYSTEM
The world is either the sum of its parts or it is more. There is a long
history of a difference of opinion on whether the latter or the former is the
most accurate vision of reality. Those believing the world is the sum of its
parts are realists, reductionists, materialists, rationalists; those believing the
world has a transcendent quality beyond aggregation are romantics, mystics,
spiritualists, believers. 2 One can be both, of course, and I take no side and
imply no promotion or criticism of either. I note the distinction only to make
clear that, when it comes to law, I take in this Essay a reductionist view. I here
think about law as a purely real enterprise, with no metaphysical element
whatsoever beyond what law actually does in the real world we can all perceive.
Indeed, my focus is even narrower than that. I want to focus on only two
things that the law does: resolve disputes and make rules. American society,
quite literally, has several systems for doing that. I focus on the civil justice
system and the means by which it resolves disputes and makes rules. Do we
know how many disputes we want resolved, or rules made, through the court
system? If not, why not? If so, how do we know? How do we know how
much we want to spend on both or either? What do we think the
consequences would be if we adjusted the system to change the number of
disputes resolved or rules made?
The law is of profound importance. Indeed, because the rules that govern
people's lives and the idea that people are entitled to justice is so important, the
law is rarely analyzed as a literal system that has inputs and outputs. There
appear to be, and in fact are, many things at stake in a legal system, things of
such fundamental significance that to think of the law as a system with inputs
and outputs that we can evaluate and adjust seems vulgar.3 In some ways, it is,
to the extent that one adopts a shriveled view of the values the law serves, and
views it no differently than a system that produces widgets. If a system
produced 100 quality widgets for $50, that system would be preferable to a
system that produced 100 quality widgets for $100. We cannot say the same
about the legal system because it is not immediately clear what the analog to
widgets is. The inputs and outputs are neither easy to comprehensively define
nor measure. It is definitely more difficult than keeping track of widgets.
2. Compare DANIEL C. DENNETr, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED (1991), with WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 1, sc. 5 ("There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are
dreamt of in your philosophy.").
3. See Brendan S. Maher, The Civil Judicial Subsidy, 85 IND. L.J. 1527, 1533-40 (2010) (discussing
the different values a civil justice system serves); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 582 (1997) (remarking that an open civil
justice system "is the linchpin of a democratic scheme, reinforcing a multitude of democratic ideals").
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On the other hand, if we could design a system that could dispense the
same number of rules (with the same content), and resolve the same number
of cases (as fairly as before) at less cost, than we would certainly be interested
in such reforms. Law is more than rules and dispute resolution, but to the
extent we can get the same level of those two things at less cost, we would
have a great interest in such a modified system, to see if it was compatible
with other constraints we might put on reform.4
Imagine, for example, if there were no dispute that all judges were
overpaid by ten percent. Reducing their salaries by ten percent would be an
incredibly desirable reform; cost would be reduced by ten percent, but system
output would remain the same. The example, of course, is fantasy. Judges
are not overpaid; almost certainly, relative to their expertise and value added,
they are underpaid.5 How much should their salaries be increased?
The answer is not clear. Judicial salaries below a certain level will attract
insufficient talent to the bench to capably resolve disputes and make rules;
judge salaries above a certain level will offer no marginal improvement on the
judiciary's ability to do those things, and may even reduce the quality of the
judge pool, by attracting people more interested in personal gain than honest
performance of duty. Both of those "levels" of pay-the not-enough-to-get-
capable-judges and the more-than-enough-to-get-capable-judges-may be
difficult to identify in practice, but conceptually they offer clear boundaries.
The harder case is the one where we all agree that increased judicial pay
does result in some marginal improvement in output, such as better rules,
fairer resolution of disputes, or more disputes resolved with no reduction in
fairness. How much are those things worth? We need to know that to
determine whether the increased cost is an attractive investment of societal
resources. Ideally, we would compare that expenditure with other potential
expenditures and choose accordingly. But that is exceedingly difficult, for
several reasons. First, it is difficult to assess whether there is any marginal
improvement at all. What does it mean for a judicial system to produce better
rules or to resolve disputes more fairly? Second, even assuming there is some
degree of agreement as to what constitutes superior rules or fairer resolutions,
what is the incremental value of such improvements; is society a lot better off
or a little better off if the judicial system produces superior rules? Finally,
even assuming those evaluating a judicial system were in agreement that a
certain reform constituted a major improvement at cost X, is it better to spend
X on improving the justice system or to spend X on improving, say, the health
care system? Rarely, if ever, are reforms to the civil justice system analyzed
4. For example, a system reform that achieved such an "improvement" through the expedient of
killing off some segment of the population would clearly be unacceptable.
5. "The dramatic erosion of judicial compensation will inevitably result in a decline in the quality of
persons willing to accept a lifetime appointment as a federal judge." JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (2007).
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in this way, which is not surprising. Comprehensive analysis of the type
described above is extraordinarily difficult and contentious.
But there is another reason civil justice reforms are rarely evaluated
comprehensively. In data terms, we do not know nearly as much about the
civil justice system as one might expect we do. As Professor Hadfield once
put it, "we know more about the on-base averages of baseball players in the
nineteenth century than we do about our civil justice system." 6 This is not, of
course, a call to know less about nineteenth-century baseball-it is delightful
to know the statistics of Oyster Bums and that he played one season for the
Wilmington Quicksteps in 1884 7-but instead a call to know more about the
legal system, at least as much as we know about nineteenth-century baseball.
There are a variety of reasons for the data-opaqueness of the civil justice
system. First, our civil justice system, like our government, is federal: there is
one national court system and fifty state systems, each with different
procedural and substantive rules, and each sitting as unconnected data islands.
Second, until recently, the relevant data was paper data, and thus not
amenable to convenient search. In the past ten years, empirical analysis of
system data has become considerably easier, and, happily, much valuable
empirical research has been done.8  But it is no understatement to say that
such work is in its infancy; we have done little more than establish small
colonies on the vast continent of Lex Empirica. One predicts that future
reform discussions will benefit from robust empirical data.9
The law-probably because until recently teasing out robust statistical
correlations has proven inconvenient and difficult-has not yet had a
Moneyball moment. For the uninitiated, Moneyball is a famous book by
Michael Lewis (and a popular movie starring Brad Pitt) that tells the story of
the Oakland A's, a small-market baseball team that could not afford to spend
as much money on its players as wealthier competitors such as the New York
Yankees.10 In order to compete, the A's sought to acquire players whose
value was not apparent under traditional means of player evaluation, e.g.,
6. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences
Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1275, 1281 (2005); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919,
1940 (2009) ("Official reformers have proceeded largely on the basis of intuition in overhauling pleading and
motion practice, while adding disclosure, discovery, conference, and settlement mechanisms.").
7. Oyster Burns Statistics and History, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.
com/players/b/bumsoy0l.shtml (last visited June 7, 2012).
8. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
119 (2002); Clermont, supra note 6. The Joumal of Empirical Legal Studies ("JELS") was founded in 2003
and now ranks as a highly cited journal. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL L.
REv. 901, 905 (2011) (discussing origin and prestige of JELS).
9. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. I 11,
1115 ("Reform proposals are based, either explicitly or implicitly, on a set of claims about how some
outcome in the world would be different (usually for the better) if the reforms were adopted. Through
empirical analysis, the researcher is able to assess the impact of these reforms, or any other policy
intervention, on those intended outcomes.").
10. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003).
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physical appearance and batting average. The conventional wisdom favored
lean, broad-shouldered specimens over portly, potatoesque players, and
favored high batting averages over lots of walks or extra-base hits. It turned
out that getting on base a lot (whether through a hit or a walk) and hitting for
power were hugely correlated to producing wins for the team, more so than
batting average and in spite of the fact that a player with such attractive stats
may physically appear to favor the couch over the ballpark. Oakland acquired
such players at attractive prices and was successful. Now the majority of
teams and observers appreciate the value of the "new" metrics, namely on-
base average and slugging percentage, employed by the A's to build a
successful team.
The rise of searchable data and a class of researchers to do it suggests
that a series of Moneyball moments await law, in terms of divining previously
unappreciated truths about the legal system and how it makes rules, changes
them, and resolves disputes. Some of those truths will be discovered by
private players seeking to profit from their discovery; others will be
discovered by academics or government researchers seeking to understand or
reform the system.
Improved empirics is not without its dangers. The law is mediated by
humans, who are self-aware and can thus alter the law by reacting to empirical
truths they did not know before. Certainly, the law already has such feedback
effects; people take actions within and without litigation in response to what
they perceive to be the recently-changed content of the law. The famous
Twombly and Iqbal cases ("Twiqbar') in which the U.S. Supreme Court
modified the federal courts' longstanding pleading requirements, may have led
to plaintiffs' attorneys, on the basis of intuition alone, declining to take cases
they otherwise would have taken." Empirical work evaluating whether
Twiqbal in fact made motions to dismiss more difficult may have altered or
confirmed plaintiffs' attorneys' intuitions.12  Now imagine if conclusive
empirical work were to discover a clear and strong Twiqbal effect with respect
to a particular type of case (or a particular type of litigant) that had been
previously unrecognized; that is, imagine if there were a clear statistical
relationship between losing a 12(b)(6) motion post-Twiqbal and having a
particular case characteristic. Litigants seeking representation for cases having
that characteristic might have a particularly hard time finding representation.
That might be good or bad, depending on the salient characteristic.
11. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see
also Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REv. 821,
823 (2010) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal changed federal pleading standards and destabilized the entire
system of civil litigation); Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REv. 53, 54 (2010)
(explaining that Twiqbal changed the old notice pleading standard to a new "plausibility" regime).
12. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59
AM. U. L. REv. 553, 598 fig. 1 (2010); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of lqbal's
Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REv. 603, 605 (2012).
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III. MEASURING RULE OUTPUT
In a recent case, the Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA") to preempt California state law regarding the unconscionability
of arbitration provisions.' 3  During the course of that opinion, the Court
discussed the merits of arbitration, including the ability of the parties to
structure arbitral resolutions according to preference, and of the informal and
expeditious nature of arbitration. 14 This is not surprising. Assessments of the
desirability of arbitration are largely couched in dispute resolution terms, that
is, whether the increased use of arbitration results in "better" dispute
resolution overall. 15 I do not renew those debates here.
I consider instead arbitration purely from a rulemaking perspective:
easier arbitration will result in fewer judicial opinions, and fewer judicial
opinions will result in lower rule output, or so one might assume. But that is
not necessarily the case. There is some optimal number of opinions beyond
which additional opinions add nothing; the marginal value of those additional
opinions, in rulemaking terms, is zero.16 Indeed there is some number of
opinions beyond which additional opinions are counterproductive, because
they obfuscate existing understanding of legal rules. I have no idea what
those numbers are, of course, and I know of no objective effort to assess at
what point additional opinions would have no rulemaking value.
I note, however, that in the last twenty years, the effective number of
opinions available to lawyers and judges has increased dramatically. Every
federal opinion written is available electronically,17 and that is increasingly true
with respect to state court opinions. There may be more "noise" than ever in
our judicial system. For the month of March 2010, Westlaw reflects over
14,000 decisions (8,696 federal and 5,414 state decisions) in which something
was "held" and that a Westlaw account holder can immediately access.18 That
is a lot of "law"; might we already be at the point at which much decisional law
is noise?19
13. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
14. Id. at 1749.
15. See generally David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments,
57 UCLA L. REv. 605 (2010).
16. By rulemaking, I include the making of new rules, the reversal of old rules, and the clarification of
existing rules. I include noncontrolling decisions in the rulemaking calculus because persuasive power
matters regarding rule development.
17. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (2002)
(requiring federal courts to make opinions available electronically).
18. The numbers were derived from a Westlaw search in AllFeds database using the search terms "held
& da(aft 3/1/2010 & bef 4/1/2010)" conducted April 6, 2012, and a Westlaw search in the AllStates database
using the search terms "held & da(aft 3/1/2010 & bef 4/1/2010)" conducted April 6, 2012. The state number
is under representative because not all state opinions make it onto Westlaw.
19. Concerns about the volume of decisions are not new. See William L. Reynolds & William M.
Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (1978); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR, ANNUAL REPORT 1971, at 7-8 (reporting that the "widespread consensus that too many opinions
are being printed and published or otherwise disseminated").
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I have intuitions on that question, 20 but my intuitions are quite the
opposite of my point, which is that I am not aware of any ongoing effort to
measure how many rules the current mass of judicial opinions are held to
have produced. There is some evidence as to the aggregate judgment of the
crowd of experts charged with knowing the law-i.e., judges and lawyers-
regarding whether there are too few or too many opinions, in rulemaking
terms.21 Reasonable inferences can be made from the publication and
citation rules of various courts: perhaps courts choose not to publish certain
opinions, or issue opinions that are not precedential, because they believe
additional opinions are noise that would confuse the law. But they may also
do so in part because they believe they do not have the time to write
opinions with due regard for their rule-making rather than dispute resolution
content. Justifications from the courts themselves on such publication and
precedent policies differ, and, in any event, the decisions of courts and their
views on the matter is only one part of the equation; it is lawyers who do
vastly more to apply the law because they advise clients every day about its
contents on matters that never get anywhere near a judge. In any event, the
significant scholarship that has developed regarding the wisdom of how
judicial dispositions are to be treated indicates a profound interest in the
power of formal and informal precedent, which is nothing more than
rulemaking output.22
One may object that such an effort-to measure the rule output of the
courts and to assess, even roughly, whether too few or too many rules are
being created-is a fool's errand. The task is not without challenges,
certainly, and I cannot refute the fool's errand charge by simply announcing a
shiny and easy strategy to measure the court system's rule output. Would that
I could. But it does not seem to be a problem akin to overcoming the speed of
light, which is physically impossible; there seem to be a number of
approaches one might take. I know of no current effort to do so, but I predict,
in the next ten years, a project of this type will occur.
The number of rules the court system is producing will vary enormously
depending on how "rule" is defined. One could plausibly if not persuasively
20. Now is not the forum to share those intuitions, which do not lend themselves to easy summary. To be
clear: I do not mean to suggest that I currently believe the system overall has an undesirable amount of noise, or
to suggest that reforms encouraging more arbitration necessarily serve a salutary "anti-noise" purpose.
21. COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. CTS. OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 81-82
(1998). Cf Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff. Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of
Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REv. 399, 405 (2002) (noting that "attorneys do not share
the view that there are too many precedential opinions available").
22. See generally Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
219 (1999); Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL.
L. REV. 755 (2003); Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends
of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L. REv. 235 (1998);
Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Citability and the Nature of Precedent in the Courts of Appeals: A Response to Dean
Robel, 35 IND. L. REV. 423 (2002); Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and
New Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705 (2006); Robel, supra note 21.
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argue that every Westlaw headnote amounts to an instance of a court
confirming or clarifying an existing rule. A simple tally of Westlaw
headnotes in federal opinions in a year would put the rulemaking tally in the
millions. A more exacting definition of rule would make the number lower.
Part of the use of such an examination, of course, is the iterative process that
would occur once Scholar One produced a first estimate of the courts'
rulemaking output. Scholar Two might have a different definition of rule or a
different means of counting. Scholar Three and Scholar Four might disagree
over the meaning, rather than the numbers, of Scholar One's analysis. But the
conversation would be extremely valuable for achieving a better
understanding of the civil justice system, and for attempting reform. If, for
example, the data suggested that certain areas of the law produced too few
rules but other areas produced too many, then arbitration would be favored in
the latter areas but disfavored in the former, setting aside other reasons why
arbitration might be attractive. And arbitration is but one of many potential
reforms that affect rule output.
IV. DATA-DRIVEN FEDERALISM
As I have explained, I am optimistic that accessible electronic data about
the legal system will lead to an improved understanding of how the system
works and its output. But it would be a mistake to ignore the process by
which superior analytics might translate into superior systems. In the last two
decades, massive amounts of data regarding the past and present civil justice
system have become readily available. There are a multitude of ways to
extract value from that data; a multitude of ways to adjust the current system
such that it requires or encourages players within the system to record their
behavior; and a multitude of ways to use the data to reform a system about
which the sovereign now has much more information.
It is not clear which approaches will be the most successful. And it is
clear that different preferences regarding a system's output exist, such that the
question of whether a given data or reform approach is desirable is almost
certainly one that should be evaluated on a sub-national basis, rather than a
national one. The need for different approaches and heterogeneity of
preferences both suggest the best approach-the best process for maximizing
the value of the coming wave of superior analytics-is one of federalism.
Younger readers might not recall the societal fears of earlier decades, but
one was rising crime. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, considerable
policymaking effort was devoted to coming up with ways in which crime
could be better and more efficiently controlled.
In 1994, NYPD Commissioner William Bratton instituted
"COMPSTAT," a new system for measuring and responding to crime. To
manage crime, COMPSTAT relied heavily on timely data and result-
626 [Vol. 51
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measured responses. 23 Many jurisdictions have chosen to adopt similar data-
driven approaches to crime management. 24 Other jurisdictions have rejected
the approach, including the Baltimore Police Department, whose earlier
attempt to adopt a COMPSTAT-like system was memorably depicted in the
television series The Wire.25  COMPSTAT would not have been possible
without improved means for extracting data from crime reports. Once
technological advances made COMPSTAT possible, New York adopted the
approach, and it spread thereafter not on fiat but based on the perceived
desirability of the approach. COMPSTAT illustrates a larger point about
reform in the wake of analytic improvement. There is considerable
uncertainty about whether analytic improvement mandates a particular
approach to maximize a certain output value, and there is an obvious diversity
of preference regarding which value should be maximized.
The extraction and application of data-driven insights will most likely be
optimized under a federalist model, in which considerable discretion is
reserved to the states. A long-recognized virtue of federalism has been the
degree to which it accommodates experimentation, something which will be
necessary when facing the tall task of making good on the promise of
exponentially better data.26 The odds are simply very small that a particular
policymaker will fasten upon the right approach to data-mining and use; the
odds are considerably greater if fifty-one sovereigns are attempting to do so.
Indeed, it is unlikely the case that a given sovereign open to several
possibilities will be able to actually pursue all of them. It may very well be,
for example, that certain data about the system can be better extracted if those
participating in the system are called upon to answer certain questions about
their expectations. There is a limit to how much a particular system can ask
particular players to plausibly do. For example, if reformers in State A are
interested in assessing whether the expected length of a case matches the
actual length of a case, it might make sense to require all litigants to submit
nonpublic estimates of dispute length. However, if reformers in State A are
also interested in other information possessed by the litigants, they need to be
careful not to ask too much of the litigants, or it may degrade the information
23. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski, & David Weisburd, Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A
Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 147,
148 (2007) ("Crime analysts collect, analyze, and map crime statistics to spot trends and help precinct
commanders identify underlying factors that explain crime incidents. Top administrators use this information
to quiz precinct commanders on the crime in their beats and to hold them responsible for solving the
problems. Failure to provide satisfactory responses to these inquiries may lead to stem criticism or removal
from command.").
24. James J. Willis & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Compstat and the New Penology: A Paradigm Shift in
Policing?, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 73, 75 (2012).
25. Baltimore Drops CompStat, AMERICAN POLICE BEAT, http://www.apbweb.com/featured-
articles/1593-baltimore-scraps-compstat.html (last visited June 7, 2012); see also The Wire, Season Three
(HBO television broadcast Sept. 19-Dec. 19, 2004).
26. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7
(2010) (discussing traditional justifications for federalism, including experimentation).
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received. To the extent reformers in State B are interested in information
being gathered by State A, they might reasonably choose to gather other
information from players in State B, in the hopes that such information can
add to the overall data about the civil justice system. Obviously for the data
from the different systems to be useful to the decisionmakers in the other
system there would need to be some similarity between the salient parts of the
two systems. Nonetheless, it is likely that significant similarity between
systems exists such that various jurisdictions can benefit from the data
extraction occurring in other systems while gathering different data
themselves.
Recent measurement attempts regarding the use of court resources have
used surveys to measure the minutes of court time devoted to particular case
events-status conferences, summary disposition motions, etc.-occurring
within the federal court system, as well as the overall minutes devoted to
particular subject areas of the law.27 These measurement efforts, in my view,
are welcomed, because they describe the degree to which the judicial
subsidy-i.e., the tax dollars expended to provide judicial services to those
who have a dispute they wish to resolve in court-is consumed by certain
types of cases and certain types of events. It would not be difficult to imagine
a state that wishes to gather more information on the judicial subsidy and
requires litigants to provide additional (nonpublic) information about
themselves, such as income level, frequency of litigation, or expected legal
bills. This information, combined with minutes consumed (per event and per
subject area) and rules produced, would provide a profoundly useful picture
of the justice system.
If, for example, commercial disputes were consuming significant judicial
minutes and resulting in modest rule output, the case would be very strong for
reforms designed at extracting user fees for such uses of the system because
there is little reason to believe such fees would hurt the system in a way that
charging court fees to injured, poor individuals would. Alternatively, one
might promote strong pro-arbitration rules for particular types of disputes,
depending on their system usage and output.
Another virtue of federalism is different responses to the same data.
Imagine if State C(alifornia) and State T(exas) analyzed their respective
systems and determined that each of them, in subject area A, had a judicial
system that devoted X judicial minutes to that subject and resolved Y number
of disputes and produced Z number of rules. Imagine further, simply for the
27. See PATRICIA LOMBARD & CAROL KRAFKA, 2003-2004 DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING
STUDY (2005); Maher, supra note 3, at 1543 ("For example, the 2003-2004 Federal Case-Weighting
Study (the first federal weighting study to formally estimate time per case event) supplied estimates of the
average time consumed by pretrial events, such as dispositive motion resolution, and included in its
estimates judicial time spent outside of the courtroom (reading briefs, doing legal research, drafting
opinions) in particular types of cases.").
[Vol. 51628
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sake of argument, that the numbers for State C and State T, adjusted for
population, were exactly the same. The desirability of reform, and the
appropriate specific reforms, would clearly vary between states. Absent a
compelling reason why a sub-national response was inappropriate (such as an
externality or a reason to believe that a state was not responsive to a voiceless
constituency), the presumption would be to permit States C and T to adopt
reforms that reflect local preference. State C, for example, might prefer
spending more money to ensure the disputes were resolved with only a very
low chance of error and favor the resolution of disputes in such a way as to
produce rule-containing opinions. State T might prefer to ensure that disputes
were resolved expeditiously and affirmatively disfavor resolutions likely to
result in rule-containing opinions.
Indeed, this is one reason to question the Supreme Court's solicitude for
nationalized approaches to civil justice reform. In two significant areas,
arbitration and benefit disputes, the Court has taken an anti-federalist
approach. Regarding the national approach to arbitration, in a case mentioned
above, the Court effectively ruled that a statute passed in 1925-almost ninety
years ago-reflected a congressional determination that arbitral resolution of
disputes be favored over state preferences to the contrary, unless state
preference was reflected in a general law of contract.28  With respect to
benefit disputes-i.e., disputes regarding the provision of health care and
retirement income to private employees, which are extremely common in
federal courts-the Court has for decades interpreted the relevant federal
statute to preclude State prerogative on most of the questions of dispute
resolution.29 One could not fault the Court were the relevant statutes-the
FAA and ERISA-abundantly clear on the scope of preemption. The Court,
after all, need apply Congress's will where it is constitutional to do so.
Yet the widely-held view, in both instances, is that the statutes are
amenable to multiple interpretations and that the Court's chosen path reflects
its own policy judgments about the undesirability of solutions other than a
centralized one. To wit, the Court, in construing the FAA and ERISA,
appears to have assertively embraced a national approach that is hostile to
traditional (i.e., broadly discretionary on the part of judges and juries)
litigation resolution, and left little room for the states to do otherwise.30 Some
deny this account, certainly, and assert the Court is doing only what the
28. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
29. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 217-18 (2004) ("Under ordinary principles of conflict
pre-emption, then, even a state law that can arguably be characterized as 'regulating insurance' will be pre-
empted if it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA's
remedial scheme.").
30. See generally David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 13 (2011)
(analyzing the Court's interpretation of the FAA); Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 433 (2010) (evaluating the Court's interpretation of ERISA).
6292012]
Washburn Law Journal
statute commands.31 But if we are to assume that the Court is exploiting
textual ambiguity to give flight to its own policy preferences, then one hopes
that the Court will realize that, in the coming years, improved analytics will
strengthen the case for a decentralized approach to civil justice reform.
Perhaps members of the current Court might now be open to reappraising
their preferences. In any event, in the next ten years, several members of the
Court will depart the bench, and one hopes the future Justices will appreciate
the need for a decentralized approach to making optimal use of the emerging
civil justice data frontier.
31. See, e.g., Stephen E. Friedman, A Pro-Congress Approach to Arbitration and Unconscionability,
106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 53 (2011) (approving of the Court's interpretation of the FAA).
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